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Abstract
This essay shall attempt to describe initially how the Commission approached the Amster-
dam negotiation in the first place. It will explore the institutional issues that it addressed and the
strategies it implemented. It then evaluates the likely impact of the new provisions of the Treaty
of Amsterdam upon the Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
After a long last night at the end of the Maastricht negotia-
tion, one head of government willingly and loudly declared to
the press, which loved it, something like, "game, set, and match."
This comment suggested that he or his country was a winner,
and, consequently, that there were losers. An intergovernmental
conference ("IGC"), however, bears only remote resemblance to
a game of tennis or the Superbowl. While it is still hard to dis-
cern who the losers were in Maastricht, at the time the risk of
being identified as one of them may have made the ratification
of the Treaty on European Union1 ("TEU" or "Maastricht
Treaty") less serene.
It seems that, possibly on account of the Maastricht experi-
ence, politicians abstained from any warrior declarations after
the Amsterdam negotiation. The Treaty of Amsterdam2 (or
"Amsterdam Treaty") was greeted by commentators with scepti-
cism for failing to reach agreement on some issues that had been
exposed to the most intense media coverage. These issues re-
ceived this exposure because they supposedly pitted the large
states against the smaller ones. But politicians know that the
Treaty of Amsterdam, like its predecessors, marks another stage
in the process of European integration. The Treaty of Amster-
dam will be followed by other treaties, for which dates are al-
ready scheduled, and the Amsterdam Treaty probably simply
* Director of Secretariat General of the European Commission.
1. The Maastricht negotiations produced the Treaty on European Union (or
"TEU"), also known as the Masstricht Treaty. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinaf-
ter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]).
2. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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represents the most to which the Member States were prepared
to agree upon among themselves at a given moment.
There is a danger in trying to describe the Treaty of Amster-
dam from the point of view of a particular institution or a partic-
ular Member State. Where there is simply progress as a whole,
suggesting winners and losers is risky. For example, the amend-
ments in the Treaty of Amsterdam that enhance the function of
the European Parliament3 and attempt to improve decisions in
foreign policy4 were not extorted from the Member States.
These amendments came as a result of the conscious and shared
view that the time had come for a proper and mature lower
chamber, which Europe could not do without, and that foreign
policy under the Maastricht Treaty had been unconvincing and
needed a serious review.
This essay shall attempt to describe initially how the Com-
mission approached the Amsterdam negotiation in the first
place, and then, evaluate the likely impact of the new provisions
of the Treaty of Amsterdam upon the Commission.
I. HOW TO POSITION THE COMMISSION IN AN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE?
Anyone who took part in the Maastricht and Amsterdam ne-
gotiations can attest that the very function of the Commission in
an IGC is less than obvious. According to Article N of the Maas-
tricht Treaty,5 it is quite simple. The Commission is an official
3. See, e.g., Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(40), O.J. C 340/1, at 44
(1997) (replacing art. 158(2), para. 1 of Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty")) (requiring Parliament's approval of nominated President of Commis-
sion); Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
214(2), para. 1, Oj. C 340/3, at 268 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 123 (not yet ratified) [herein-
after Consolidated EC Treaty] (art. 158(2), para. 1 of EC Treaty), incorporating changes
made &y Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of
the EC Treaty will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-
79 (1997).
4. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(10), O.J. C 340/1, at 9-16 (1997)
(replacing tit. V of Treaty on European Union ("TEU")); Consolidated version of the
Treaty of European Union, tit. V, O.J. C 340/2, at 155-62 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 70-73
(not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU] (tit. V of TEU), incorporating changes
made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of
the TEU will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European
Union. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
5. TEU, supra note 1, art. N, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
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party at an IGC and, therefore, fully participates in it. But the
Commission does not sign the resulting new treaty, and for that
reason the exercise remains an "inter-governmenta' conference.
In practice, however, the Commission's function in an IGC
raises strategic problems as to the position that the Commission
should represent. First, should the Commission act as the depos-
itor of an ideal European construction? The Commission would
then repeatedly call for total integration and distance itself from
any compromise or less-than-perfect solution. Although this
strategy is utopian in character, it does have a certain tactical
side, as the May 1968 students in Paris discovered when they ad-
vocated, "Be realistic, ask for the impossible." There is a certain
charm in this uncompromising approach. Moreover, under this
approach the long-term objective is never forgotten.
A long-term vision of Europe represents an underlying issue
in any IGC, but the issue of the precise nature of such a long-
term vision of Europe is extremely divisive for the Member
States. As a result, there has been, since Maastricht, at least an
implicit agreement not to raise this issue and to proceed with an
apparently practical, step-by-step approach.
Moreover, an effort by the Commission to act as the deposi-
tor of an ideal European construction creates two risks. The first
risk is that the gap between an "ideal" position and a "realistic"
one could be so large that the Commission would simply be
viewed as out of touch and consequently marginalized in the
IGC negotiations. The second risk created by this approach is
that, because an ideal project might ultimately include a sort of
supranational kind of government constituted in the form of the
Commission or some derivative of it, some IGC participants
would see the Commission as defending corporatist, vested inter-
ests. The Commission has been criticized in the past for such pro
domo pleadings, usually described, ironically, as the Commission
"acting as a sixteenth Member State."
The issue of the Commission's function in an IGC raises
other strategic problems as well. Abandoning the ideal for the
practical, should the Commission simply act as an "honest bro-
ker," reconciling conflicting views? Certainly not, because this
difficult role is already played by the rotating presidency of the
Council. It is always confusing to have two intermediaries.
Moreover, a Commission attempt to act as an "honest broker"
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would make it very hard for the Commission to have any political
voice of its own.
Thus, instead of seeking utopia or serving as an "honest bro-
ker," the strategy taken by the Commission for the Amsterdam
negotiations was one that could be described as striving to attain
"the highest possible realistic line." It was not aiming at identify-
ing a "least common denominator" among the Member States,
but at trying systematically to raise the outcome of the confer-
ence above what would be comfortably acceptable. This strategy
was embodied in the two main texts of substance produced by
the Commission: its May 1995 report on the functioning of the
Maastricht Treaty6 and its February 1996 Opinion on the Inter-
governmental Conference.7 The Commission strategy implied
the taking of a number of choices in advance and the drawing of
deliberate tactical consequences from the choices. Inherent in
the strategy was the concentration on a few key issues in order to
attain maximum efficiency. These key issues are described be-
low.
II. KEY INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The two issues of highest priority were easily identified.
First, the need for more efficient decision-making, particularly in
the perspective of the forthcoming significant enlargement of
the European Union. Improved decision-making necessarily re-
quires a maximum use of qualified majority voting' ("QMV"),
and a reduction in the use of unanimous voting. The Commis-
sion took a maximalist position at the outset, drawing on the
mathematical reality that the difficulty of achieving unanimous
agreement rises exponentially with any increase in the number
of participants taking part in a decision. Thus, in a Union with
thirty Members, reaching a unanimous decision would not be
twice as difficult as achieving unanimity with fifteen Members,
6. Commission's Report for the Advisory group, adopted on May 10, 1995. Ref.
ISBN 92-827-4179-6.
7. Commission's Opinion. To strengthen the political Union and to prepare the
enlargement, adopted by the Commission on February 28, 1996. Ref. ISBN 92-827-
5858-3.
8. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
TEU, supra note 1 (setting forth weighted votes of Council for qualified majority). For
a discussion of qualified majority voting, see GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 52-53 (1993).
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but instead would be approximately forty million times more dif-
ficult. If such were the case, even amendments to the Treaty
would become improbable in the future. There was, therefore, a
case for arguing for the total elimination of unanimous voting
procedures.
But total elimination of unanimity for action in certain
fields was clearly requesting too much. Nobody could envision
anything other than requiring unanimity for Treaty amend-
ments, even for amendments to provisions of a trivial regulatory
nature, which abound in the Treaty. Also, the ministers of fi-
nance rallied together to maintain the need for unanimous ac-
tion for all fiscal matters. This rally even included ministers rep-
resenting States that objectively had the least to gain from main-
taining unanimity. Further, these ministers insisted upon
maintaining unanimity for fiscal issues, even when they relate to
attaining the internal market rather than concerning national
budgets. For example, unanimity is presently required when
eliminating the existing areas of double taxation for businesses
established in more than one Member State, or upon efforts to
improve of to simplify rules concerning indirect taxes, even
though they are already highly harmonized.
Many will agree that the modest degree to which the Am-
sterdam Treaty expands the fields of qualified majority voting in
the Council represents a disappointing outcome. The inability
to achieve more constitutes a threat for the future.
The call for the second institutional priority, a more demo-
cratic functioning of the institutions, could be heard from many
sources. This demand came not only from the European Parlia-
ment, but also from almost all Member States, from the Consti-
tutional Court of Germany, various non-governmental organiza-
tions, and simple good sense. Naturally, the Commission also
sought a more democratic system of institutional structures and
operations. It was absolutely clear that any extension of the
Community order would require a more proper and classically
democratic system. Failing this, we would undoubtedly face ma-
jor constitutional problems in Member States and eventually
bring the European construction to a halt.
In the Treaty of Amsterdam, enhancement of the demo-
cratic process was mostly achieved through a very profound re-
view of the role of the European Parliament in its legislative ca-
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pacity. Three problems were tackled in this respect and the solu-
tions of these problems included: the extension of the co-
decision procedure to new fields of legislative action,9 the re-
moval of the Parliament's so-called "unfair" third reading in the
Treaty of Maastricht's co-decision procedure, 10 and new provi-
sions intended to achieve more "transparent" governance."
The Commission supported and sometimes engineered the
above solutions.
12
In doing so, the Commission took one necessary precau-
tion. The Commission made sure that its monopoly power to
initiate the legislative process, from which much of its political
power derives, would not be endangered. If the Commission
were to lose its present power to issue the critical draft of any
legislative proposal, then the general balance between the three
9. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2, OJ. C 340/1, at 26-48 (1997) (amend-
ing extending co-decision procedure under art. 189b of EC Treaty to arts. 6, 8a(2), 51,
56(2), 57(2), 73o, 75(1), 109r, 116, 118(2), 119(3), 125, [27(4), 129(4), 129d, 130e,
130i(1), 130o, 130s(1), 130w(1), 191a(2), 209a(4), 213a(1), and 213b(1) ofECTreaty);
see Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 13, 18(2), 42, 46(2), 47(2), 67, 71(1),
129, 135, 137(2), 141(3), 148, 150(4), 152(4), 156, 162, 166(1), 172, 175(1), 179(1),
255(2), 280(4), 285(1), 286(1), O.J. C 340/3, at 185, 186, 194, 196, 196, 203-04, 205,
236, 238, 23940, 242, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 252-53, 254, 255, 257, 282, 293, 294, 294
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 82, 82, 86, 87, 87, 91, 92, 107, 108, 109,110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
115-16, 116, 117, 118, 130, 136, 136, 136 (arts. 6, 8a(2), 51, 56(2), 57(2), 73o, 75(1),
109r, 116, 118(2), 119(3), 125, 127(4), 129(4), 129d, 130e, 130i(1), 130o, 130s(1),
130w(1), 19la(2), 209a(4), 213a(1), and 213b(1) of EC Treaty).
10. Compare Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(44), O.J. C 340/1, at 46
(1997) (replacing art. 189b(6) of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
251(6), O.J. C 340/3, at 280 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (art. 189b(6) of EC Treaty), with
EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189b(6), O.J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
695.
11. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(4), O.J. C 340/1, at 7 (1997)
(replacing art. A, 2 of TEU) (stating that "[t]his Treaty marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which deci-
sions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen") (italics
indicates language added by Treaty of Amsterdam to art. A, 1 2 of TEU); Consolidated
TEU, supra note 4, art. 1, 2, O.J. C 340/2, at 152 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 68 (art. A, 1 2 of
TEU); Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 2(45), OJ. C 340/1, at 46 (1997) (inserting art.
191a into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 255, OJ. C 340/3, at
282 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 130 (art. 191a of EC Treaty on access to documents); Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra, Declaration on Article 191a(a) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, OJ. C 340/1, at 137 (1997); id., Declaration on the provisions relat-
ing to transparency, access to documents and the fight against fraud, O.J. C 340/1, at
140 (1997).
12. See its document on the extension of the co-decision procedure. SEC (97)
1411 (July 24, 1997).
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political institutions-the Council, the Parliament, and the Com-
mission-would be profoundly altered.
On the whole, the Commission's power of legislative initia-
tive was never seriously questioned-despite some efforts from
Germany-for two main reasons. First, the Parliament was wise
enough not to request any such power of legislative initiative.
Parliamentarians knew that if they did, so would the Council. If
both the Parliament and the Council shared the power of legisla-
tive initiative with the Commission, the Commission's role would
be drastically weakened, upsetting the present balance of institu-
tional power. A proper and distinct right of initiative for the
Parliament and Council would be logical only if and when the
Commission were given proper and full governmental powers.
Second, and more generally, during the Amsterdam Treaty
negotiation, and in sharp contrast with those on the Maastricht
Treaty, the Commission as such did not come under attack, or,
when it did, the Commission always found overwhelming sup-
port. Part of the reason why the Commission's power of initia-
tive was never really disputed may have been that many Member
States took issue with the abrasive way in which some large states
approached the question of their representation in the Euro-
pean Union-the so-called large versus small Member States is-
sue. These Member States may well have concluded that their
best protection against a directoire of a few large countries lay
with a strong Commission. Presumably, the Member States also
concluded that, if this were the case, they had better insist on
retaining the present structure in which every State has at least
one Commissioner within the body of the Commission.
III. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In contrast with its deep concern about the proper resolu-
tion of the two issues discussed above, the Commission took the
view that two other conspicuous institutional issues, namely,
what should be the total number of Commissioners and how the
system of weighted votes in the Council should be modified,
were grossly overvalued. Several large Member States made the
re-weighting of votes a top priority. Their position made some
sense in the context of future enlargement because the new
Member States would be almost entirely small in population and
economic importance. Thus, enlargement of the Union would
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have the mechanical effect of significantly diluting the represen-
tation of the large states in the Council.
The issue of proper representation is very familiar to our
American colleagues. In the debate on the U.S. Constitution, a
participant protested: "How unreasonable and unjust that Dela-
ware should have a representation in the Senate equal to Massa-
chusetts or Virginia? The latter of which contains ten times her
numbers, and is to contribute in that proportion?"13 Further-
more, James Madison confirmed in a famous letter of November
1787 to Thomas Jefferson that "this issue created more embar-
rassment, and a greater alarm for the Convention, than all the
rest put together."1 4
Indeed, the larger Member States sometimes presented
their position in an abrasive way and soured the debate on the
issue, which naturally deteriorated into a political conflict. But
strangely enough, whatever voting formula for the Council may
be adopted in the next IGC, this formula will probably not dras-
tically change the present landscape. It has been estimated that
none of the Council voting formulas envisaged during the last
IGC would have produced any change in the final outcome in
decisions taken by the Council over the past three years.
The question of the desirable maximum number of Com-
missioners is more serious, and the case seems strong for slim-
ming down the size of the present Commission. But it finally
appears that the principal issue is only whether the large Mem-
ber States will retain their present second Commissioner. In
other words, the issue will probably be whether a Union com-
posed of twenty Member States will have a Commission consist-
ing of twenty or twenty-six Commissioners? This sort of issue is
important, but decidedly not fundamental.
It would have been another matter if the tempting idea, put
forward by France, to create a "managerial" Commission with
much fewer Commissioners than Member States, had taken off.
But this suggestion proved unacceptable to almost everybody:
9 unacceptable to the new Member States, Sweden, Finland,
and Austria, because they had only just emerged from ratifi-
13. Debate on the Constitution, Letter from the "Federal Farmer" to "the Republi-
can," N.Y., Nov. 8, 1787.
14. Debate on the Constitution, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
N.Y., Oct. 24, 1787.
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cation debates where their ability to appoint their own Com-
missioner played an important role in achieving a successful
popular vote, so that they could not now change their posi-
tion on this;
* unacceptable to the smaller Member States because they
suspected that any missing Commissioners would be their
own Commissioners; and
" unacceptable to Germany and the United Kingdom if it im-
plied that they would have no Commissioner for some pe-
riod of time. In fact, the French proposal would have been
acceptable to them only if they were assured a permanent
seat in the Commission while other Member States would
rotate, a kind of U.N. Security Council system that few were
prepared to envisage.
Finally, the Commission submitted the issue of strengthen-
ing the role of its President. The Commission felt that this
change was necessary regardless of whether the number of Com-
missioners was altered. The IGC achieved a relatively easy agree-
ment on two main improvements:
" the President would have a much greater say in the appoint-
ment of the Commissioners because he or she would have
to approve them,15 and
" the President would be able to allocate and to reshuffle the
portfolios of the other Commissioners much more easily. 6
IV. THE STRATEGY OF THE COMMISSION ON SOME ISSUES
OF SUBSTANCE
Other participants in this symposium cover in-depth some
of the issues concerning the substantive fields of operation of
the European Union. This allows me to touch briefly on three
of them: foreign affairs, justice and home affairs, and flexibility.
A. Common Foreign and Security Policy
With regard to modifications in the common foreign and
15. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 2(40), O.J. C 340/1, at 44 (1997)
(replacing art. 158(2), para. 2 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
214(2), para. 2, Oj. C 340/3, at 268 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 123 (art. 158(2), para. 2 of EC
Treaty).
16. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, Declaration on organisation and function-
ing of the Commission, O.J. C 340/1, at 137 (1997).
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security policy,17 the Commission felt uneasy. This area did not
seem prepared for any radical changes and the IGC did not
make any. Common foreign and security policy remains a sepa-
rate, intergovernmental pillar. The necessity for unanimity re-
mains, although at least the solution called for in vain by the
Commission at Maastricht was finally endorsed, namely, that im-
plementing action can be decided by qualified majority voting.
Eventually, the IGC agreed upon many other improve-
ments, but these are mainly of an administrative nature. One
argument that the Commission repeatedly made was that there
must be consistency between the economic and diplomatic sides
of foreign policy. Because foreign policy is presently split be-
tween two separate pillars, there is a constant risk that the right
hand will ignore what the left hand is doing. But this obvious
argument did not succeed because a few member States saw this
argument as an attempt to blur the line between the pillars and
to weaken the diplomatic, intergovernmental one. The main
discernible result of this campaign is a new version of the
troika,8 which will now consist of the Council Presidency, the
Secretariat General, and the Commission, instead of the previ-
ous troika consisting of the past, present, and future Council Pre-
sidencies.19 While this new troika is an interesting combination,
it remains to be seen how much it will be used.
B. Justice and Home Affairs
In contrast, the Commission thought from the outset that
major modifications could be achieved in the area of justice and
home affairs.2" Despite the very sensitive nature of the area and
the traditionally rather conservative administrative bodies in-
volved, there seemed to be a set of favorable circumstances. All
European states currently give a high priority to internal secur-
ity. Issues such as international crime, immigration, and asylum
policy are on the top of governmental agendas everywhere. In
17. See TEU, supra note 1, tit. V, OJ. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 729-34 (Provisions on a common foreign and security policy).
18. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, art. 1(10), O.J. C 340/1, at 13 (1997)
(replacing art. J.8 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 18, O.J. C 340/2, at
159 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72 (art. J.8 of TEU);
19. No legal base in the previous Treaty.
20. See TEU, supra note 1, tit. VI, OJ. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735-38 (Provisions on cooperation injustice and home affairs).
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addition, the prospect of enlargement of the Union to include
East European states naturally posed sensitive issues with regard
to the free movement of people, resulting in a perceived neces-
sity to improve the acquis in the field ofjustice and home affairs
before the enlargement negotiations were started.
There was also a consensus that the Maastricht "third pillar"
had been a failure. Many, including the Commission, insisted
that the third pillar had not only been a failure, but a total fail-
ure. And more interestingly, they offered to demonstrate that
one of the main reasons for this failure lay in the Maastricht
treaty, which had retained as the legal mechanism for action a
tool that was far too weak, namely the old classical international
convention, so painfully signed and so rarely ratified. Perhaps-
and this is an entirely personal and unkind shadow of a
thought-the IGC negotiators, who were the ministers of for-
eign affairs, desiring to achieve presentable results in Amster-
dam, were more willing to consider transfers of power to the
Union from the portfolios of their colleagues, the ministers of
interior, rather than transfers of their own competencies.
Finally, there was the need to do something about the
Schengen Agreement,21 which had gradually developed outside
the EU Treaty framework, initially among six, but now expanded
to thirteen Union States. The risk of letting two different and
parallel legal orders develop, that of the Schengen Agreement
and that of the EU Treaty, was easy to identify.
Thus, when confusion reached a peak, a few simple ideas
served to clarify a very complex issue. First, it was useful to stress
that most of what should be co-ordinated between Member
States was already in the course of preparation either in the
Council or in the Schengen context. The proposed changes
would not be a revolution involving brand new issues or new un-
tried grounds. Second, the progress made to date under the
Schengen Agreement was attained in a highly opaque manner,
without the involvement of any democratic control, sometimes
through highly disputable administrative agreements. The same
criticisms could largely be made with regard to progress under
21. Schengen Agreement Between The Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of controls at the common frontiers, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68, 73
(1991).
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the third pillar. If the attempt was to be made to improve either
the Schengen structures or that of the third pillar and to intro-
duce parliamentary and court controls, then it would be easier
and cleaner to look for solutions in the proper and classical
Community order rather than in some ersatz imitation of it.
Put these ideas together and the best solution is to "commun-
autarizd' the whole area, Schengen included, which would be
thus integrated in the European Community Treaty framework.
This approach would transfer the fields of asylum, immigration,
judicial civil law, and visas to the Community, while leaving crim-
inal law and police issues to cooperation within an improved in-
tergovernmental framework. The status of the United Kingdom
and Ireland, the two Union States that had not joined in the
Schengen Agreement, would become covered by the first illus-
tration of the new system of flexibility, discussed below. The
above description represents, broadly, the framework that was
ultimately set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam and its Protocols.
C. Flexibility
The much-debated subject of flexibility deserves a few obser-
vations. The concept was immediately divisive. Some, in particu-
lar those who had reasons to believe that they might be left out
on some issues, saw in it a fragmentation bomb. Others felt that
the concept was essential to the progress of a cohesive Europe.
Within the Commission, it was difficult to decide one way or the
other, but clearly caution was necessary.
A further twist was that the more flexibility was discussed
within the IGC, and the more that it appeared that flexibility
might apply in sensitive Community fields such as taxation, in-
dustrial policy, or social policy, the more flexibility made sense-
but not for foreign affairs, where other devices were specifically
elaborated. As a matter of caution and to prevent any abuse or
uncontrolled use of flexibility, however, the IGC finally agreed
on a key point: the Commission should have the power to re-
view any use of flexibility in a field of Community competence.
Ultimately, the IGC decided that this flexibility or "closer coop-
eration" will be governed by very strict, but not unattainable,
conditions. The Council can only act to permit an instance of
flexibility after the Commission has made a proposal to this ef-
1999] S83
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fect, which will or will not be made depending on whether the
Commission believes that the Treaty conditions are met.
CONCLUSION
The paragraphs above provide a slight caricatural insider's
view of the strategy, and sometimes of the tactics, of the Commis-
sion. On the whole, the Commission took the view that the
Treaty of Amsterdam was going to be a milestone along the road
to European Union, not an end product. Commentators who
were expecting some great institutional overhaul before the next
enlargement of the Union have been disappointed and have, for
the moment, written off the attainment of the Treaty of Amster-
dam. But it has to be said that, after two years of work and re-
flection, proper solutions in the great institutional debate have
proved to be curiously elusive.
A few things that will considerably shape any future institu-
tional discussion seem quite certain. First, nobody wants to start
with a tabula rasa out of which a brand new system would be
built. To depart radically from the recipe of a success story
seems unwise. Second, the issues postponed in the Amsterdam
IGC-the re-weighting of the votes in the Council and the fixing
of the number of Commissioners-do not require any radically
new system either. These issues can probably be solved when
pressure mounts to do so immediately before the next enlarge-
ment. Third, there is no magic formula that can confound
mathematics. The functioning of the European Union will inevi-
tably b e more difficult with twenty-one or thirty Member States,
than it was with the initial six or even with the present fifteen.
Accordingly, most of the modifications that urgently need to be
made represent only fine-tuning. This adjustment applies partic-
ularly to any modifications made to the Council, the institution
that will be most affected by the next enlargement. Ultimately,
there is one single major reform that ought to be made-a
change to the general use of majority voting for all Community
matters. It is here that modifications of the Treaty on European
still has far to go: in the short term majority voting may prove
possible in the field of justice and home affairs, then to be pro-
gressively introduced for foreign policy decisions, and finally be-
come the mode for the amendment of the Treaty itself. Europe
will then have a proper constitution.
